We first propose an authenticated key exchange (AKE) from the LWE problem. The AKE is simple since it does not involve any other cryptographic primitives to achieve authentication and depends on solely the LWE problem in the worst-case (e.g., SVP and SIVP). We give its security under the BR model, which captures wPFS and might be appealing in specific applications.
Introduction
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is one cryptographic tool in establishing secure communication channels which provide secrecy and authenticity for both communication parties. AKE not only allows parties to utilize their known information to compute a session key which is unknown to anybody except for parties, but also ensures authenticity of communication parties, so that an adversary cannot impersonate one party in the conversation.
In an AKE, each party has a static public key which is produced by its static secret key and certified with a party's identity through a public key. Communication parties utilize ephemeral secret keys to generate ephemeral public keys and compute a session state from their static public/secret keys, the ephemeral public/secret keys, and the transcripts of the session. Communication parties then obtain a session key from these values using a key derivation function.
The session key guarantees data integrity and confidentiality, which implies that security notion for AKE should be developed. To handle this case, Bellare and Rogaway [1] first provided BR security model for AKE which was based on indistinguishability. The BR95 [2] and BPR2000 [3] models were extensions to the BR93 model. Although the BR model captured key authentication, for example, confidentiality of session keys, and basic security requirement, for example, known key security and impersonation resilience, it cannot grasp more complex scenes if one party's static secret key or session state was revealed. Accordingly, Canetti and Krawczyk [4] defined the first Canetti-Krawczyk CK model which grasped the leakage of static secret keys and session state. But it was not resilient to advanced attacks, for example, key compromise impersonation (KCI) and perfect forward secrecy (PFS) which guaranteed an adversary not obtaining the session key after a completed session even if the static private keys of the parties were subsequently revealed. To resist advanced attacks, Krawczyk [5] proposed HMQV protocol in the CK+ model (which was stronger than CK model [6] ) and showed that no 2-pass AKE achieved PFS. Alternatively, he presented weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS) which guaranteed security only for previous sessions without an adversary's intrusion. Namely, wPFS declared that the session key was still private if the static keys of a completed session were revealed [5] . To modify the CK+ model, LaMacchia et al. [7] and Sarr et al. [8] proposed the eCK model (which was not stronger than the CK model) and the seCK model, respectively. This paper will only show AKE security under the BR model [1] .
In the past three decades, there appeared a large number of AKEs based on number-theoretical problems [9, 10] . With the rapid development of computing technology, for example, quantum information technology, quantum computer brought great threat to these protocols based on classic number-theoretical problems. With a quantum computer, quantum polynomial time algorithm [11] for factorization and the discrete logarithm problem had brought challenges 2 Mathematical Problems in Engineering for these traditional cryptosystems. Recently, researchers plan to focus on quantum resistant cryptographic primitives. Lattice-based cryptosystem was one potential candidate for postquantum.
To date, there existed a lot of lattice-based cryptosystems [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] because lattice-based cryptosystems can capture strong security proof based on worst-case hardness assumption that can resist quantum attack and be implemented efficiently. What is more, most of lattice-based cryptographic constructions [12, 15, 16] were based directly upon one of the two average-case problems that had been shown to enjoy worst-case hardness guarantees: the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem [12, 15] and the (Ring-) Learning with Errors problem [13, 14, 16] .
As mentioned above, in view of the security guarantee against quantum adversaries, there had been a great number of lattice-based cryptosystems [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , which offered resilience against quantum computer attack. Cryptographers especially had put effort into constructing various key exchanges (KEs) and AKEs from the (Ring-) LWE problem, for example, lattice-based KE [20] which can only be secure in passive model but made a big step in constructing a postquantum KE and a NTRU-KE based on Ring-LWE [21] , as well as lattice-KEs [22] [23] [24] [25] . However, we only know a few of results on lattice-based AKEs [17-19, 24, 26, 27] . What is more, Ding et al. presented an attack with the leakage of the signal function [28] on RLWE based KE [20] . Gong and Zhao presented a small field attack (SFA) [29] on the one-pass protocol [24] . Motivated by post-quantum security, our paper will focus on the construction of a lattice-based AKE based on the LWE problem [13, 14] . Our basic AKE is simple and comes with a rigorous proof of security based on the LWE problem under the BR model. The AKE is simple since it does not involve any other cryptographic primitive to achieve authentication and depends solely on some hard lattice problems in the worst-case (e.g., SVP and SIVP). We prove its AKE security with wPFS under the BR model.
Ding et al. [28] showed that KE based on RLWE problem could be broken by analyzing the number of signal changes of each of the coefficients. Ding and Lin [20] utilized the signal function to construct a KE from (Ring-) LWE. Theoretically, the KE from LWE [20] could be broken by the attack with the leakage of the signal function [28] , as the KE from (Ring-) LWE [20] only referred to matrix-vector multiplication in finite field. Hence, our proposed lattice-based AKE from the LWE problem could suffer from the same attack with leakage of signal function [28] ; here we do not study it and omit it. Gong and Zhao exploited a SFA (with a property of the CRT basis of , i.e., Proposition 5 in [29] ) against one-pass AKE [24] although the SFA may not violate the security of onepass AKE [24] . Notice that SFA [29] applied only to a special case of the original Ring-LWE problem [16] which sufficed for [24] . Likewise, maybe there exists a similar SFA (with the help of some properties) to break our proposed AKE since every cryptosystem will be broken in the future. And we do not know whether SFA can be applied to the LWE problem since Ring-LWE problem is one special case of the LWE problem [13, 14] . For example, cyclotomic polynomial [30] which was essential for SFA [29] applied only to polynomial ring. We leave them as open problems. Maybe our AKE could capture AKE security and resist some advanced attacks under the CK model, the CK+ model, or the eCK model, but we leave them as future works. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains definitions and properties related to lattice. In Section 3, we construct a lattice-based AKE based on the LWE problem. Section 4 gives its AKE security under the BR model. Section 5 gives comparison. Conclusion is in Section 6. The BR model is given in appendix.
Preliminaries
Notations. Assume that is the main security parameter. Let notations be as defined in [13, 14] . Let Λ be a discrete subset of . The Gaussian function on R centered at ∈ R with any positive ∈ R is , (x) = exp(− (‖x − c‖ 2 / 2 )), ∀x ∈ R . Let , (Λ) = ∑ x∈Λ , (x) be the discrete integral of , over Λ and D Λ, , be the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center and parameter . Concretely, ∀ ∈ R , ∀ ∈ R, define D Λ, , (x) = , (x)/ , (Λ), ∀x ∈ Λ. If = 0, ,0 and D Λ, ,0 are shorted for and D Λ, , respectively.
Regev proposed the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [13] .
For integers ≥ 1 and ≥ 2, ∈ (0, 1). Let s ∈ Z , , be the distribution on Z × Z obtained by choosing a vector a ∈ Z uniformly at random and a noise term ← , , and output (a, ⟨a, s⟩ + ) ∈ Z × Z .
The LWE problem is as follows: for uniformly random s ← , given poly( ) number of samples that are either from , or uniformly random in × , output 0 if the former holds and 1 if the latter holds.
The decision LWE problem is at least hard as approximating several problems on -dimensional lattice in the worstcase withiñ( / ) factors using a quantum computer [13] if ≥ 2√ , = poly( ). Brakerski et al. [31, 32] showed that the LWE assumption still preserved if = ⟨a, s⟩ + for ∀ ∈ Z + and ( , ) = 1 but security loses with a √ factor. The HNF-LWE assumption [32] declared that HNF-LWE problem was still hard if the secret came from the error distribution; for example, ← , . Formally, a random noise vector with a Gaussian distribution is used to prove that certain lattice problems are in coNP [33] . Lemma 1 [33] gives a norm bound of Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 1 (see [33] ). For any -dimensional lattice Λ, a vector ∈ , and reals 0 < < 1, ≥ (Λ), we have
Signal Functions [20] . Define the signal function discussed in [20] . For prime > 2, given = {−( − 1)/2, . . . , ( − 1)/2}, = {−⌊ /4⌋, ⌊ /4⌋}, define as the signal function in : ( ) = 0 if ∈ and 1 otherwise as follows.
For simplicity and requirements in some places, set
For any ∈ , + cha( ) ⋅ (( − 1)/2) mod belongs to
We define modular function mod 2 ( , ) from × {0, 1} :
where ∈ , ∈ {0, 1}. Modular function was discussed as robust extractor [20] and can guarantee the correctness of our protocol.
Lemma 2 (see [20] ). Let > 8 be an odd integer; the function mod 2 defined above is a robust extractor with respect to with error tolerance /4 − 2.
Lemma 3 (see [20] ). For any odd > 2, if is uniformly random in , then mod 2 ( , ) is uniformly random conditioned on ∈ {0, 1}.
Lemma 4 (see [24] ). Let be the security parameter and odd prime = 2 (log ) . For any ∈ {0, 1} and ∈ , the output distribution of mod 2 ( + , ) conditioned on cha( ) ∈ {0, 1}, where the probability is taken over the uniform and independent choice of ∈ .
One AKE from the LWE Problem
Let ≥ 1 and ≥ 2 be integers, ∈ 0, 1, is prime. For the same integer , let ℎ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be KDF which is modeled as random oracles.
Sample Proof. From the form of , ,
we obtain
By Lemma 1, we have
with overwhelming probability. That indicates and being sufficiently close.
By Lemma 2, with mod 2 with respect to with error tolerance /4 − 2, we have
Further, we show that
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This is because
and | + cha( ) ⋅ (( − 1)/2)| < /4 + 1. Hence, we have
Parameter Selection. Here select the same parameters as those in [20] : = , = 4 , = 1/ . It is easy to verify that ≥ √ and the correctness holds.
Security
In our AKE, the public matrix ← × is public and every static public key actually consists of a LWE tuple with Gaussian parameter . Thus, the static public key is computationally indistinguishable from a random element in under the LWE assumption. Analogously, and are also computationally indistinguishable from random elements in under the LWE assumption with Gaussian parameter . To show the randomness of the session key, it is enough to take Bob as an example. Obviously, if is random over , is statistically close to {0, 1} even conditioned on by Lemmas 2 and 3. Note that ℎ is a random oracle; thus is uniform over {0, 1} . Now, we check the randomness of :
It is necessary to establish the randomness of on the hardness of the (decisional) LWE problem, since , are actually LWE instances, and , are random elements in under the LWE assumption with Gaussian parameter . Generally, we will prove that is statistically close to a real LWE instance if the secret and the error are randomly from D Z , . Since = + 2 mod ∈ and = + 2 1 mod are random over , thus
is random over . That is, is statistically close to a real LWE instance.
Formally, let be the maximum number of parties and be maximum number of sessions for each party. We separate the security proof for the initiator and responder, respectively. Proof. The security analysis is performed with a sequence of games 1, for 0 ≤ ≤ 4. It starts with the real security game, between an adversary A and a simulator S, that models the indistinguishability of the fresh session key. Use to show the differences between the previous game and its next one. Let 1, be the event that A outputs a guess : = in
Game 1,0 . This is the original game where the messages are generated honestly. In Game 1,0 , S randomly selects * , * ← {1, . . . , } and * , * ← {1, . . . , }, and hopes the adversary will choose * = (Π, , * , * , * , ( * , * )) as the test session, where * is output by * th session of party * , and * is output by * th session of party * activated by a 1 (Π, , * , * , * ). S selects ← × at random, honestly generates static public keys for all parties by randomly choosing , ← D Z , , and simulates the attack environment for A. Specifically, S keeps one table for random oracle ℎ and responds to queries of A.
(i) ℎ(in) queries: if there is no tuple (in, out) in , it randomly selects an element out ∈ {0, 1} and adds (in, out) to list. At last it returns out to A.
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(ii) 0 (Π, , , ): A initiates a new session of with intended partner , S randomly selects , 1 ← D Z , and sends = + 2 1 mod ∈ to A on behalf of Alice ( ).
(iii)
1 (Π, , , , ): S randomly selects , 2 ← D Z , and computes = + 2 2 mod ∈ , , , and according to the protocol. Finally, send ( , ) to A on behalf of Bob.
(iv)
2 (Π, , , , , ( , )): S computes , by using , according to the protocol.
(v) SessionKeyReveal(sid): let = (Π, * , , * , * , * , * ); S returns if session key of has been produced.
(vi) ( ): return Alice's static secret key to A.
, or and are not output by the * th session of * and the * th session of * , respectively, S stops. Otherwise, S randomly selects ← {0, 1}, and ← {0, 1} . If = 0, S returns ; else it returns the real session key of .
Analysis of 1, 0 . In this game, S randomly selects * , * ← {1, . . . , } and * , * ← {1, . . . , } independently from the view of A. Hence, the probability that will not stop in 1,0 is at least 1/( 2 ⋅ 2 ).
1,1 . S first computes = + 2 2 mod , where
Then, it acts almost the same as in 1,0 except for the case below.
, or it is not the * th session of * , S responds to the query as in 1,0 . Otherwise, S randomly selects ← D Z, and computes = − ⋅ mod . Then S computes = ⋅ + ⋅ mod :
Finally, it honestly computes , according to the protocol and sends ( , ) to A.
Analysis of
is computationally indistinguishable from uniform distribution over ; thus the probability that A guesses the correct = − ⋅ before is negligible. Since = + 2 mod , , ← D Z , , we have
By Lemma 1, the norm of each entry in both − and 
, or it is not the * th session of * , S responds to the query as in 1,1 . Otherwise, S randomly selects ← D Z, and computes = − ⋅ mod . Finally, it sends to A.
or it is not the * th of * , S responds to the query as in
is output by the * th session of party * , let be the session key of session = (Π, , , , , ( , )), S sets = . Else, S computes = ⋅ + ⋅ mod . At last, it honestly computes according to the protocol.
Analysis of 1, 2 . The proof of the distribution of being statistically close to that in 1,1 is the same as the proof of Analysis of 1,1 ; as a result, the probability that S stops in 1,2 is negligibly close to that of 1,1 . Under the LWE , , assumption, we have
1,3 . S randomly chooses ← and acts almost the same as in 1,2 apart from the following case. 
Next, we analyze
Let ( , ) be output by the * th session of = * and ( , ) be the information that finishes the test session (e.g., the * th session of party = * ). In 1,4 , is randomly selected from uniform distribution over which is independent from both public keys and transcripts (except for ). This still holds even if the adversary uses a session key reveal query to obtain , since is randomly chosen and ℎ is a random oracle. Let be the element computed by ; according to the protocol, and are sufficiently close; that is, = + mod ;
for some with short element. Since both public keys and transcripts (expect for ) are random and independent from , is also independent from without the adversary's view. Since mod 2 ( , ) = mod 2 ( + , ), then = mod 2 ( , ) is also statistically close to {0, 1} by Lemma 4. Namely, the probability that the adversary query ℎ( , , , , , ) is at most 2
Let ( , ) be output by the * th session of party = * and ( , ) be the message that can finish the test session (e.g., the * th session of party = * ). Consider two cases.
(ii) = . In this case, = = ℎ( , , , , , ), where = mod 2 ( , ). Since, in 1, 4 , is randomly chosen from the uniform distribution over , then is statistically close to uniform distribution over {0, 1} from the adversary's point by Lemma 4. Thus the probability that A has made ℎ query with is less than 2 − + negl( ).
(iii) ̸ = . By assumption that 1,4 does not happen, thus A will never make a ℎ query with .
In short, the probability that A has made a ℎ query with is negligible since ℎ is a random oracle. If the adversary does not make a query with exactly, s distribution is uniform over {0, 1} in the adversary's point. Thus, Pr
In a word, we get Pr 
By the law of the probability,
Thus
Combining this with Pr[ 1,4 | ¬ 1,4 ] = 1/2 + negl( ), we obtain
This finishes the proof. (i) ℎ(in) queries: if there is no tuple (in, out) in list, randomly select out ∈ {0, 1} and add (in, out) to list. Then, send out to A.
(ii) 0 (Π, , , ): A initiates one session of with intended partner , S randomly selects , 1 ← D Z , and returns = + 2 1 mod ∈ to A on behalf of Alice ( ).
(iii)
1 (Π, , , , ). S randomly selects , 2 ← D Z , and computes = + 2 2 mod ∈ , , , and according to the protocol. Then, send ( , ) to A on behalf of Bob.
(iv)
2 (Π, , , , , ( , )): S computes , by using , according to the protocol. Analysis of 2,0 . In this game, S randomly selects * , * ← {1, . . . , } and * ← {1, . . . , } independently from A's view. Thus, the probability that will not stop in 2,0 is at least 1/( ⋅ 2 ).
2,1 . S acts identically as in 2,0 except for the following case. 
Finally, it honestly computes , following the protocol, and sends ( , ) to A.
(iii)
2 (Π, , , , , ( , ) 
At last, it computes according to the protocol. 2, 4 . In 2,4 , we have Analysis of 2, 5 . The only difference between 2,4 and 2,5 is that S replaces the real = ℎ 2 + in 2,4 with a randomly chosen ∈ in 2,5 . Since ℎ is a random oracle, the only difference will not affect the A's view until it makes a ℎ query with derived from . Formally, denote 2, for = 4, 5, 6 as the event that A makes a ℎ query with derived from . Now, we prove that if LWE , , is hard, then
Analysis of
Because ℎ is a random oracle, 2,4 is independent from ( ) ' ] ≤ negl( ), this completes the proof. But it is not easy to do so. As a matter of fact, though ℎ 2 is random in the adversary's view under the LWE assumption, we cannot have the fact that = ℎ 2 + is random since is related to ℎ 2 . Now we show is random. If we randomly chose another̃← D Z, ,q and obtain =̃ℎ 2 + we have = +(̃− )ℎ 2 . That is, − = (̃− )ℎ 2 . Naturally, if the adversary can distinguish (and ) from a uniformly chosen one, it can distinguish ℎ 2 (which is computationally under the LWE assumption) from a random chosen from .
Actually, 2,5 will happen with negligible probability according to Lemma 1. Let * = (Π, , * , * , , ( , )) be the test session. By assumption that A is a adversary, namely, is not output by * by a
(which is the same as in 2,4 ), wherẽ← D Z, , . By our assumption, A will make a ℎ query with derived from with probability at least Pr [ 2, 5 ] . Now, fixing ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 , which are all chosen by S and are independent from the adversary's actions, S sets̸̃ = by randomly choosing̃, ← D Z, , and sets = + (̃− )ℎ 2 . By Lemma 1, A will utilize to finish the test session and makes a ℎ query with derived from with probability at least [ Analysis of 2, 6 . Since the only difference between 2,6 and 2,5 is that S replaces ℎ 1 = + 2̃1 and ℎ 2 = with randomly chosen elements in , , respectively, an adversary that distinguishes the difference between 2,5 and 2,6 could solve the LWE , , problem. Hence, under the HNF-LWE , , assumption, 2,6 is computationally indistinguishable from 2, 5 . In particular, we get
Besides, we can get Pr[ − 2,6 ] = negl( ). Actually, in 2,6 , S does not really compute and (it cannot compute the values since ℎ 1 is randomly chosen from and ℎ 2 is randomly chosen from ). Suppose that and (e.g., the values determined before) are as A's target values.
= +(̃− )ℎ 2 especially holds, since A cannot efficiently distinguish 2,6 from 2,5 as mentioned above. Since ℎ 2 is uniformly distributed over and independent from A's view (thus is independent from and ), then = mod 2 ( , ) is statistically close to uniform over {0, 1} even when conditioned on = mod 2 ( , ) by Lemma 4 ((̃− ) is in invertible with overwhelming probability). Thus, the probability that A will make a ℎ query with is at most 2 − + negl( ). Namely, Pr( − 2,6 ) ≤ 2 − + negl( ), which is negligible in . Namely, Pr[ − 2,6 ] = negl( ).
Generally speaking, Analysis of 3, 0 . In this game, S randomly chooses * , * ← {1, . . . , } and * ← {1, . . . , } without A's view. Thus, the probability that will not abort in 3,0 is at least 1/( ⋅ 2 ).
3,1 . S acts identically as in 3,0 except for the following cases. 
At last, it computes , according to the protocol and sends ( , ) to A. 3, 1 . Let 3, be the event that A outputs a guess = in 3, , = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Similar to the Analysis of 1,1 , under HNF-LWE , , assumption, we have
3,2 . S acts identically as in 3,1 , except it replaces the public key for the party * with a uniformly chosen * ← . , according to the protocol and returns ( , ) to A.
Analysis of 3, 3 . Similar to Analysis of 1,1 , under LWE , , assumption, then
3,4 . S first computes ℎ 1 = + 2̃2 , ℎ 2 = , where ,̃2 ← D Z , . Then it computes = ℎ 1 + 2 2 = + 2(̃2 + 2 ) (or set = ℎ 1 ), where 2 ← D Z , , . Finally, it acts identically as in 3,3 except for the following cases.
, or it is not the * th session of party * , S responds to queries as in 3, 3 . Otherwise, S randomly selects ← D Z, , , and computes = − ⋅ mod ,
At last, it computes , according to the protocol and returns ( , ) to A. 3, 4 . Similar to Analysis of 1,1 , under LWE , , assumption, then
3,5 . S acts identically as in 3,4 apart from the following cases. and computes = − ⋅ mod . Then, it randomly selects ← and computes , as described in protocol. If A has made a ℎ query ℎ( , , , , , ), S stops. Otherwise, it randomly selects ← {0, 1} and sets ℎ( , , , , , ) = . At last, it returns ( , ) to A. 3, 5 . The only difference between 3,4 and 3,5 is that S replace the real key = ℎ 2 + = + +2( + 1 ) mod in Game 3,4 with a randomly chosen ∈ in Game 3,5 . Since ℎ is a random oracle, the only difference cannot affect A's view until it makes a ℎ query with derived from . Denote 3, for = 4, 5, 6 as the event where A makes a ℎ query with derived from . Now, we prove
Because ℎ is a random oracle, 3,4 is independent from ( )' 3, 4 in adversary view. In particular, ( )'s distribution is random and uniform over {0, 1} ; namely, the advantage of A guessing is negligible if 3,5 does not happen. This completes the proof.
Likewise, let * = (Π, , * , * , , ( , )) be the test session. By assumption that A is a ℎ adversary, namely, is not output by party * , given ℎ 1 = + 2̃2 , ℎ 2 = in 3,5 , denote = ℎ 2 + (which is the same as in 3,4 ), where ← D Z, , . By our assumption, A will make a ℎ query with derived from with probability at least Pr [ 3, 5 ] . Now, fixing ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 , which are all chosen by S and are independent from the adversary's actions, S sets̸̃ = by randomly choosing̃← D Z, , , and sets =̃ℎ + = +(̃− )ℎ 2 . By Lemma 1, A will utilize in the test session and makes a ℎ query with derived from with probability at least [ 3,5 ] ⋅ 2 − . Denote − 3, as an event for = 5, 6;
A in 3, will make , in A's two runs, where is derived from in A's first run and is derived from = + (̃− )ℎ 2 in A's second run. In particular, Pr[
3,6 . S randomly chooses ℎ 1 ← , ℎ 2 ← and acts identically as in 3, 5 .
Analysis of 3, 6 . On the one hand, the difference between 3,5 and 3,6 is that S replaces ℎ 1 = + 2̃2 , ℎ 2 = with randomly chosen elements in , , respectively; an adversary that distinguishes the difference between 3,5 and 3,6 could solve the HNF-LWE , , problem. Under the HNF-LWE , , assumption, 3,6 is computationally indistinguishable from 3, 5 . In particular,
On the other hand, in e 3,6 , S does not really compute and ( it cannot compute them since ℎ 1 is randomly chosen from and ℎ 2 is randomly chosen from ). Suppose that and (e.g., the values determined before) are as A's target values. = + (̃− )ℎ 2 especially holds, since A cannot distinguish 3,6 from 3,5 as mentioned above. Since ℎ 2 is uniformly distributed over and independent from A's view (thus is independent from and ), then = mod 2 ( , ) is statistically close to uniform over {0, 1} even when conditioned on = mod 2 ( , ) by Lemma 4 ((̃− ) is in invertible with overwhelming probability). Thus, the probability that A will make a ℎ query with is at most 2 − + negl( ). Namely, Pr( − 3,6 ) ≤ 2 − +negl( ) which is negligible in . As a result, Pr[ − 3,6 ] = negl( ).
Generally speaking, by Analysis of 3, 6 choosing , ← D Z , ), and simulates security game for A. In particular, S preserves one table for random oracle ℎ, and responds the queries from A in the following.
(i) ℎ(in) queries: if there is no tuple (in, out) in , randomly select an element out ∈ {0, 1} and add (in, out) to list. Then send out to A.
(ii) 0 (Π, , , ): A initiates a session of with intended partner ; S randomly selects , 1 ← D Z , and sends = + 2 1 mod ∈ to A on behalf of Alice ( ). Analysis of 4, 0 . In this game, S randomly selects * , * ← {1, . . . , } and * , * ← {1, . . . , } independent from A's view. Thus, the probability that will not stop in 4,0 is at least 1/( 2 ⋅ 2 ). Let 4, be the event that A outputs a guess = in 4, , = 1, 2, 3, 4.
4,1 . first computes = + 2 2 mod , where
Then, it acts identically as in 4,0 except for the following cases. 
Finally, it honestly computes , following the protocol and returns ( , ) to A. 4, 1 . Similar to Analysis of 1,1 , under HNF-LWE , , assumption, we have
4,2 . S first computes = + 2 1 mod , where
Then, S acts identically as in 4,1 , apart from the following cases. 
Since (ii) 0 (Π, , , ): A initiates a session of with intended partner ; S randomly selects , 1 ← D Z , and returns = + 2 1 mod ∈ to A on behalf of Alice ( ).
(iii) 1 (Π, , , , ): S randomly selects , 2 ← D Z , and computes = + 2 2 mod ∈ , , , and according to the protocol. At last, send ( , ) to A on behalf of Bob.
(iv)
2 (Π, , , , , ( , )): S computes , by using , according to the protocol. (vii) Test(sid): let = (Π, , , , , ( , )); if ( , ) ̸ = ( * , * ), or and are not output by the * th session of * and the * th session of * , respectively, S stops. Otherwise, S randomly selects ← {0, 1}, and ← {0, 1} . If = 0, S returns ; else it returns the real session key of . 5, 0 . In this game, S randomly selects * , * ← {1, . . . , } and * , * ← {1, . . . , } independent from A's view. Thus, the probability that will not stop in 5,0 is at least 1/( 2 ⋅ 2 ). 
Analysis of
Finally, it honestly computes , according to the protocol and sends ( , ) to A. 
This completes the proof.
Comparison of Performance and Security
At present, there is a handful of results on lattice-based AKE under the BR model. [4] . ACCE means authenticated and confidential channel establishment [18] . Rom means random oracle model. × denotes no Rom. Assum. denotes underlying hardness assumptions. GDH stands for gap DiffieHellman assumptions. Qua. denotes quantum attack. Yes means resisting quantum attack; No means suffering quantum attack.
Note that NAXOS [7] , CMQV [34] , and HMQV [5] referred to exponentiation computation and achieve AKE security with wPFS in GDH assumption which indicated that they were vulnerable to quantum attack although they are secure in stronger model. Compared with NAXOS [7] , CMQV [34] , and HMQV [5] based on GDH assumption, our protocol has much more advantages in terms of computation because our protocol grasps matrix-vector multiplication besides resistance to quantum attack. In terms of Sec., [18, 26, 27] captured OW-CCA, CCA + , and CPA security without wPFS. But ours achieves security and wPFS without authentication tools under the BR model.
The new protocol has a good balance between computation and security.
Conclusion
This paper first proposes an AKE from the LWE problem. The AKE is simple since it does not involve any other cryptographic primitives (e.g., MAC, signature) to achieve authentication and depends on solely the LWE problem in the worst-case (e.g., SVP and SIVP [12] [13] [14] ). Security analysis with wPFS is proved to resist five kinds of adversaries under the BR model and it might be appealing in specific applications.
This paper also motivates interesting open problems, such as an attack on it, converting it to one AKE under the CK model. If our lattice-based AKE is improved, it may achieve CPA and CCA security with wPFS, PFS, KCI, and so on under the CK, eCK, and CK + model. Maybe there exists a SFA on our protocol. We do not study them here and leave them as the future works.
